







A NEW AND MOST IMPORTANT LIGHT  
THROWN BY THE SCRIPTURES

ON THE TEXT,

“RENDER UNTO CÆSAR THE THINGS  
THAT ARE CÆSAR’S,

AND

UNTO GOD THE THINGS THAT  
ARE GOD’S;”

AND ALSO UPON MATTERS RELATING  
TO THIS TEXT.

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# WHAT TO GIVE UNTO GOD AND CÆSAR.

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By J. C.

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[We earnestly request all our readers to give this article a careful perusal. We especially recommend it to those of them in the United States of America who are now engaged in the struggle as to whether Jehovah should be acknowledged in the Constitution of the States. We would also recommend it to those Voluntaries in Britain who assert that because there is nothing said in the New Testament about political governments giving support to the Church, therefore a nation should neither endow religion, nor establish it by acknowledging that one God is the true God, and that other gods are false gods. We would especially recommend it to Pastor C. H. Spurgeon, who acknowledges himself to be a Voluntary. If he would endeavour to refute it, either in his own Magazine or in these pages, God might bless it to be the means of bringing about a concurrence of opinion on this important subject between followers of Christ who at present disagree about it. It might help to create a union of Protestants.—*Ed. of U. K. A.-P. L. Mag.*]

## THE GROUNDWORK.

THE account of man's origin and development, as revealed to us in the inspired "words of truth and soberness," tell us—first,

that "God made man upright;" second, that He created him with a twofold nature, body and soul, each equally and conjointly designed for the service of his Maker; third, that this service was destined to be rendered in a twofold sphere of existence, the present life and a future one, and hence, that man's obligations and responsibilities have a relation to both worlds; fourth, that man was designed to permanently fulfil the end of his being, not in the present, but in the future life, and that hence the present life is but provisional and preparatory in relation to the next; fifth, that as man has thus a common relation to both worlds, with an ultimate relation to the next, whatever is ultimately good in relation to the body and the present life must be equally so in relation to the soul and the future life, and *vice versa*; sixth, that the body and the soul being thus designed to co-operate in the same service of the same Master, and to share in the same responsibilities and the same destinies, *can have no divided interests.*

From these few but pregnant items of Revelation, the legislators and educators of man may derive infallible rules for the exercise of their functions without the aid of the Pope. The plain first principle which should guide all governors and educators is, that man should be governed and educated according to the constitution and laws of his nature; and the plain first principle which should guide us in investigating the constitution and laws of his nature is to ascertain the *object of his being*, because it is obvious that *the nature of man must be adapted to fulfil the object of his existence.* Now, it is evidenced by the logic of nature herself, as well as by the testimony of Scripture, that the object of man's existence must be *to serve the Being that gave him existence.* Hence it follows:—

1st. That any ruling or educating agency which does not rule and educate man with reference to the service due by man to his Maker, *does not rule or educate in harmony with the nature of man, but in opposition to it.*

2nd. That as the object of man's existence has an equal relation to the body and soul, any ruling or educating agency which does not rule and educate in relation to the obligations and interests of *both*, *does not rule and educate in harmony with the nature of man, but in opposition to it.*

3rd. That as the object of man's existence is to be mainly fulfilled in the conditions of a future life, any ruling or educating agency which does not rule and educate man with reference to



the relations and interests of the future life, *does not rule or educate in harmony with the nature of man, but in opposition to it.*

How man came to apostatise from his Maker and from the object of his existence, and thence to be ruled and educated by another and for other objects, is also a question whose solution must be known and accepted by those who would rule or educate humanity on right principles. When Mr. Darwin and his followers have succeeded in accounting for the "origin of species," and thence for the origin of man, they will have next (as philosophers, concerned not merely in the origin, but in the *characteristics* of species,) to account for that peculiar anomaly in one of the species—the existence of evil in man. This is not merely a speculative question, as it is usually treated by those who seek for its solution simply to gratify curiosity. We feel no proper interest in the question of evil if we do not desire to *cure it*; and we can pursue no proper course in any attempt to cure it, unless we know the *origin or cause of it*. There are, we know, social reformers of the rationalistic school who adopt the practice of the empiricist or quack, and seek to cure the symptoms or consequences of original evil with a confessed ignorance of the cause. As to the origin of evil in any other world than our own, we need not much concern ourselves, as we have only to seek to cure it, and consequently to discover the cause of it in our own. The great universal symptom of this evil is *unhappiness*. Every other animal except man can be made happy, man never! Man is the only incurable malcontent in the world—the only one perpetually plagued, even in his best condition, with a state of unrest and *malaise* which, apart from Revelation, he can neither account for nor cure. The symptom exists, too, under Mr. Darwin's favourite law of development; for if we take madness and suicide as two of the most reliable, although extreme criteria of the symptom, these, according to the statistics of the day, are not only increasing, but increasing in every country in the same ratio as civilisation (or what we characterise as civilisation) advances.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN APOSTACY.

According to the Scripture already quoted, "God made man upright" (Eccles. vii. 29), that is, He made him without any constitutional tendency to swerve from rectitude. It was therefore simply impossible for him to fall from any inherent defect or tendency of nature. Accordingly, he fell from the influence of a cause *external to himself*, or by the interposition of an agent of



evil that operated in the same mediatorial relationship to man's fall as Christ bears to his recovery. The word mediator is currently used in the sense of a *peace-maker*, but in the abstract it signifies a *war-maker* as much as a peace-maker. It was such a war-maker that caused the apostacy of the human race; and man could no more have fallen except through the agency of this mediatorial war-maker, than he can now rise from his fallen position without the agency of the mediatorial peace-maker.

We have seen that according to the original constitution of man, his body and soul—the present life and the future—can have “no divided interests” between them. “Divide and govern,” was the maxim by which the old Roman war-maker sought to conquer, and afterwards to reign, over the rest of mankind, and by its employment he succeeded to an unprecedented extent in subduing humanity to his iron sway. But this “wisdom of the serpent” was utilised by a much earlier victor and ruler than the old Roman. Not by that old serpent which the geologists exhume from its fossil tomb, but by “that old serpent the devil” (Rev. xx. 2), doubtless then, as he has been since, “transformed into an angel of light.” (2 Cor. xi. 14.) “Let us,” said he, “divide between God and man, and between man and Paradise. Then, in the exiled family of humanity, and in every individual of the race, let us divide between the interests and pursuits of the body and those of the soul, and between the interests of the present life and those of the next; let us make the interests of the body and the present life appear to be one thing, and those of the soul and the future life another; moreover, let us make the interests of the body and the present life override and ultimately extinguish in the hearts and pursuits of man the interests of the soul and the future life; let us make the fallen ones believe in this world, love this world, and live for this world, and thereby let us come to reign as the god of this world; and it was so!”

And so the success of the cleverly designed and cleverly executed scheme speedily secured to Satan a moral kingdom on earth—a commonwealth of believing and faithful subjects, who fully concur in his policy of separating between the interests and pursuits of the body and those of the soul, and between the interests and pursuits of the present life and those of the next, and who have come to express the separated interests and pursuits by such terms as secular and sacred, temporal and spiritual, politics and religion, &c. The Scriptures witness to the success of this Satanic scheme, not only by assigning to its author titles expressive of his acquired dominion, as the “god of *this world*,” “the prince of *this world*,” the “ruler of the darkness of *this*



world," but by testifying to the completely subjugated condition of his subjects. "The whole world *lieth* in wickedness." (1 John v. 19.)

This kingdom of Satan, as already said, is a *moral* kingdom, because the subjects of it have come under his influence and government by operations affecting the mind, and especially the mind in the exercise of *belief*. As there is a "faith of the operation of God," there is a faith of the operation of Satan—"the spirit that worketh in the children of disobedience" (Eph. ii. 2)—and who can create, intensify, or extinguish the faith of his own operation just as it suits the exigencies of his government. This may be strikingly illustrated with respect to past and present variations of *belief in himself*—that is, belief in his personality and power—two articles of faith in which he is specially interested. Formerly he impressed mankind with such a vivid sense and terrible apprehension of both, that the Papacy which promoted this popular terror for its own objects, organised itself into a great insurance company against fire in the other world, and issued unlimited policies under the name of indulgences, whose premiums loaded the priesthood with wealth, and proportionally beggared the insured throughout Europe. The policies of the company being all taken out with deferential awe of the power of the devil (a power necessarily worshipped, in this way, by all unacquainted with the power of Christ), constituted so many acts of real homage to the potentate whom the Scriptures tell us to "resist," but never to fear; so that for centuries the policy-holders in Europe were constantly engaged in one vast scheme of propitiatory devil worship. It was mainly this fear of the devil which built all the monasteries and chapels of Europe, and even at the present day it is the great source of the vast income-tax called Peter's Pence, and the innumerable death-bed legacies by which "the Church" is enriched, and the natural inheritors of property made paupers on the public.

But Satan sees that the time is closely approaching when he can no longer hope to reign through superstition, and that the world has got into a condition when he can better rule it by spreading dubiety, and, as far as he can, a total disbelief in his personality and power. To many, therefore, who still retain a general credibility in Revelation, his name stands there for a carnal principle personified; while among those on whom he successfully operates to eradicate all belief in divine truth, about the first article of faith which he tries and succeeds to extinguish is *belief in himself*. Those who know him to be "a liar from the beginning," and who "are not ignorant of his devices," will see in the present day spread of unbelief in the devil, fresh evidence that the close of his reign will be distinguished by the most overreaching



strategy on his part, and the most profound delusion in the world upon which he operates.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK OF REDEMPTION.

The work of redemption has for its object to "destroy the works of the devil," or to restore the severed fellowship between God and man, to reunite the divided interests of the body and the soul, and of the present and future life; to cause man to respond to the original design of using the present life and its concerns as a preparation for the next, and so to turn the tables on the devil and his policy, that the soul may become the ruler of the body, and "the powers of the world to come" overrule the powers of "the world that now is."

The work of redemption is eminently one of development, and came to be administered in a series of modifications of religion usually called dispensations. Every new dispensation embraced some new disclosures of divine truth on the part of God, and some corresponding obligations on the part of man. This process of gradually unfolding the plan and ministering the provisions of redemption was necessary to accord with the preparatory and educational design of man's existence in this life. For his preparation and education in grace require to be such as to concur with the progress of his natural capacities to receive higher revelations of divine truth, and to render higher and more spiritual obedience to divine commands; and, from the nature of humanity, capacities thus to understand and obey can only be acquired by commensurate experience and providential culture.

With every new instalment of dispensational grace, Satan recurred to his old policy, "divide and govern," with the result of creating a collateral aggravation of human apostacy. The design of this article requires to notice only the Jewish and the Christian dispensations, with their respective apostacies.

#### THE JEWISH DISPENSATION AND APOSTACY.

The Jewish Commonwealth is usually characterised as a *theocracy*, or a government by God. No small amount of obscurity, however, seems to prevail as to what constitutes the essence or distinguishing quality of such a government. Although the Jewish theocracy associated for a long season the peculiarity of miraculous interpositions, it does not follow that these were necessary to its continuance as a theocracy, and, in all probability, they were designed to cease when the Commonwealth should come to be duly consolidated; just as miracles ceased in the Christian dispensation when the Churches came to be sufficiently

organised, and believers able to “walk by faith instead of by sight.” It must be admitted, that if Christ is God—a position assumed throughout these pages—then His present government, as “Head of the Church,” is a theocracy without miracles; and such supernatural phenomena, whether real or pretended, are now, according to Scripture, to be regarded as marks not of a theocracy, or a government by God, but of a demonocracy, or a government by the devil. (Matt. xxiv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 9.) Again, it cannot be essential to a theocracy that it should not include a constitution of human governors; for the Jewish Commonwealth was organised from the beginning with the design of having its laws administered through a body of such rulers. Eliminating these non-essentials, then, we are led to conclude that the true and the only necessary and distinctive features of a theocracy are,—

First, That the legal constitution, or the laws, should derive their authority from God.

Second, That the official constitution, or the rulers, should derive their authority from the laws.

#### THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION OF THE JEWISH THEOCRACY.

The legal constitution of the Jews was a threefold code—the *moral*, *ceremonial*, and *political* law.

**The Moral Law.** The system of precepts contained in the Jewish Decalogue differs from all merely human systems of morals, in being a strictly *theocratic* code; so that any nation or Government adopting it as an element of its legal constitution, at least, *so far* adopts the first essential of a theocratic government—namely, that the law should derive its authority from God.

The question whether the decalogue was designed to have such a *national* relation extended to the Christian dispensation, is one which needs to be duly examined. But that it was designed to have perpetual and universal relations of some kind is indicated even in the circumstances which distinguished the promulgation or the giving of this law from those under which the other laws of the Jews were published.

This was the only law delivered to the Jews by God *personally* acting. (Exod. xx. 18, 19.) The rest of the laws were delivered by Moses and succeeding delegates. The reason of this distinction (brought about, according to the passage referred to, by what some people would call an accident), seems to be this: the decalogue was delivered personally by God, because designed to possess universal relations, or relations co-extensive with His



universal sovereignty, in which position He can *have no human representative*. The ceremonial code and particular political statutes of the Jews being designed exclusively for that people, and with the view to establish peculiar relations between God and the nation, were delivered by delegates who could and did represent the Divine Ruler in those peculiar relations to the nation. The question whether the decalogue was designed to have a *national* use in the future states and kingdoms of the Christian dispensation, is one to be examined further on.

**The Ceremonial Law.** The Jewish ceremonial law stood as a means to an end in relation to the moral law. It was given to the Jew as a means to acquire those dispositions of heart and will which were necessary to the right fulfilment of his moral duties. Except, therefore, to constitute a system of spiritual feeding and medicines, calculated to check the inroads of sin and promote dispositions to duty, the ceremonial law, or obedience to it, had in it no more of the religious element we call “good works,” than the reception of food and medicine by the body can lay claim to be regarded as a process of bodily labour. All the “means of grace” in the New Testament dispensation are of this merely subservient character. It is the substituting of such means for the end, or *the means to religion for religion itself*, that constitutes one of the leading forms both of self-delusion and hypocrisy in all the dispensations; and in the case of the Jews it constituted the chief of the many forms which characterised the apostacy of that people, as we learn from such Scripture passages as these:—

“To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats,” &c.—Isa. i. 11.

“Is not this the fast that I have chosen?—to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?”—Isa. lviii. 6, 7.

**The Political or Civil Law.** The law of every State has a twofold relation to the subject—first, to regulate the duty of the subject to the ruling power; second, to regulate the duty of the subjects to each other. In the first relationship the law is called *political*, and the ruler the *political power*; in the second relation, the law is called *civil*, and the ruler the *civil power*. It must



however, here be admitted, that the duty which the subjects owe to each other is also indirectly included in the duty which the subjects owe to the ruling power; although the duty which the subjects owe to the ruler is not so included in the duty which a subject owes to his fellow-subject.

Political or civil law is simply *moral law applied in detail* to the regulation of duties which grow out of the mutual relations of rulers and subjects, or of subjects and subjects. The science or art by which moral law may be rightly applied or adjusted to political legislation, constitutes the science of *jurisprudence*; and it is evident that the righteous or unrighteous character of this legislation will depend upon the character of the moral law, or the views of the moral law which the science has accepted as a basis. In all ages, moral philosophers have been exploring the characteristics and relations of man, to discover some determinate rule of right, *independent of religion*, and in all ages they have signally failed in the search. It does not aid the searcher in this case that the Scriptures declare "the work of the law is written in the heart," because this proposition can only be accepted and utilised by those who accept Revelation, while those who seek to establish a moral system independently of religion, must, of course, seek for it on independent evidence. It is evident that the searcher for morals apart from religion has but one fundamental principle to guide him—namely, the principle of *justice*, which, in its concrete or practical form, may be defined, *the voluntary or compulsory exchange of equal benefits or equal injuries between two parties*—a benefit returned for an equal benefit received; an injury returned for an equal injury received. Any system of morals, and therefore of politics, which ignores or infringes this necessary foundation of all moral conduct, must be a false system.

It has been seen a few pages back, that to govern or educate humanity on right principles, it must be governed in harmony with the nature and wants of man. But any system of morals, and therefore of legislation, based upon *simple justice*—that is, any system which does not make provision for the exercise of *mercy* as well as justice—cannot harmonise with the nature and wants of man, for the well-known reason that man, in his present nature and surroundings, can never render the full and unfailing obedience demanded by a law of perfect and inexorable justice. Hence, a system of legislation adapted to human nature must be such as to associate the principles of mercy and justice *without any detriment to either*. But mercy and justice are mutually destructive, and cannot be combined by any ordinary law known to humanity. When the civil magistrate inflicts punishment upon some criminal who has injured society, this is an act of



justice to the society which he has injured—one which society demands for the preservation of its own well-being. But when, by an act of mercy, he pardons the criminal, if the infliction of the punishment would have been an act of justice to the public, then the pardon of it is an act of *injustice* to the same public. Hence no system of laws devisible by the ingenuity of man, can be at once in harmony with justice and with the nature and wants of man. Nothing but the inimitable provision of the atonement, and the magistrate acting as a delegate of God, in dispensing justice and mercy on the basis of that provision, can ever constitute a moral foundation for a righteous political code; and those Protestants who are now agitating for divorcing the connection between politics and religion, are simply agitating for the divorce of politics from the only moral scheme on which can be founded a system of legislation at once in harmony with justice and the wants of humanity.

If all political law is, or ought to be, thus based upon moral law, it is evident that the first thing necessary to the establishment of harmonious relations between the civil ruler and his subjects is, that both should be agreed as to the system of morals which should constitute the basis of legislation. It is because Papists and Protestants hold opposite views on some of the most essential points of morality, so that what one calls *virtue* the other calls *vice*—that Papists can never submit to the legislation of a Protestant government without compulsion, and that the same must be the case with Protestants under a Popish Government.

The political law of the Jews, which included regulations touching the landed, commercial, and other material interests of the nation, was founded on the decalogue so far as morality was concerned, and upon the ceremonial law so far as the means to morality were concerned. As a religious law is that which derives its authority from God, and as all the three laws of the Jews were equally derived from His authority, the politics of the Jew were identified with his religion; what was secular was also sacred, and what was temporal was also spiritual. He was taught by his laws that he was as much, or rather much more, engaged in the service of God when he was ploughing his field than when he was offering sacrifice; and that when (with a spirit in harmony with his duty) he obeyed the command to bring such an offering of the first fruits of his harvest, the *consecrated labour* which produced them was the most essential element of homage indicated by the symbol.



## THE OFFICIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE JEWS.

The regular official constitution of the Jews, when the commonwealth had become fully developed and established, consisted of *Prophets, Priests, and Kings*, three offices that had a corresponding relation to the moral, ceremonial, and political laws. The constitutional prophet, however, was a *moral* or general instructor, and not a *predictor*, as the word in time commonly came to more specially signify. The Prophets, Priests, and Kings, therefore, represented functions which are now respectively expressed by the terms *educational, ecclesiastical, and political*.

The educational and ecclesiastical functionaries of the Jews were confined to one tribe—the tribe of Levi,—doubtless to indicate the close connection which should exist between the educational and religious functions of the State. When the educational appointments of the Jews came to be matured, the Levites—that is, the educational functionaries, including all the tribe of Levi, except the family descendants of Aaron, to whom the priesthood was confined,—had their colleges or “schools of the prophets,” as they were called, distributed throughout the forty-eight cities which were assigned to them in lieu of the allotment of land to which the tribe had been entitled, and the manual labours connected with which would have interfered with their scholastic calling. The Levites based their secular system of instruction, whatever that might be, on the moral law. They were the moralists of the State. The scribes and lawyers of the New Testament were doubtless legal *literati*, descended of the Levitical scholastics.

The ecclesiastical body, or the Aaronic priesthood, were officials committed to the ministry of the ceremonial law, with some helpers derived from families of the Levites. The priests were in no proper sense *teachers* of the people. Their functions, like all ritualistic functions, were all but purely *mechanical*, and the fulminations of Isaiah and other divine messengers against them prove that, like the sacerdotal and ritualistic artists of the present day, the Jewish priesthood became a body of mere craftsmen.

When in the full development of the official constitution the political office came to be exercised in the person of a regular monarch, the supremacy of the political over the educational and ecclesiastical offices became marked and decisive. Indeed this supremacy was manifested from the very beginning of the constitution. Moses, though the younger brother of Aaron, was the unrestricted ruler of the latter (Exod. iv. 16), and is expressly styled “*King* in Jeshurun” (Deut. xxxiii. 5). When Aaron grew jealous of this supremacy, and joined his sister Miriam in



her seditious conspiracy against the political head of the state, the high priest narrowly escaped the judgment with which God afflicted Miriam (Numbers xii. 1, &c.). When the monarchy was permanently established—that is, under David and Solomon—both monarchs exercised the fullest supremacy over the priesthood and religion. And it is worthy of special remark, that when Solomon had completed the temple, he himself, a layman, and not the high priest, was the official who consecrated and presided over the ceremonies by which the temple was dedicated to the Divine Ruler of the kingdom. In the subsequent reigns, and in the kingdoms both of Israel and Judah, the civil head being the appointed guardian of the national religion, we find the nation providentially judged or favoured just as the civil power exercised his guardianship faithfully or unfaithfully. The apostacy of the priesthood mattered but comparatively little in relation to the temporal prosperity of the kingdom. It was when the *king* “did evil in the sight of the Lord,” as when David, with an eye to ascertain the military efficiency of his kingdom, numbered the people, that God visited the nation with judgments; it was when the *king* “did that which was right in the sight of the Lord,” that God preserved the nation from its enemies.

It was the same in reference to those heathen states that preserved any sense of responsibility to the Divine Ruler of kingdoms. It was when “the *King* of Nineveh rose up from his throne,” and not only repented himself, but issued his decree for national humiliation, that God cancelled the sentence which was about to be visited upon the devoted but happily rescued city.

As all the laws of the Jewish Commonwealth were equally *religious* laws, all the officials—the educational, ecclesiastical, and political—were equally *religious* officials; the only difference being, that one class of officials presided over one department of religion, and the other over another department of religion. Religion is the fulfilment of active obligations we owe to God and man, and as this service is necessarily manifold and various, God avails himself of the valuable principle of the division of labour and labourers, or of functions and functionaries, to render that service more orderly and effective.

The political and ecclesiastical officials being thus only different functionaries in the service of the same Master, the Commonwealth of the Jews did not admit the present-day distinction of the Church and State in the constitution—a distinction founded on the prevailing distinction between religion and politics, and this, again, on the prevailing creed, that the interests of the soul are one thing and the interests of the body another. As the Jew’s politics were identified with his religion,



so his State was identified with his Church. The whole community constituted a State-Church, or rather, a Church-State; for religion was not established by the State, but the State was established by religion.

Such was the Jewish Commonwealth in its leading lineaments, legal and official. Its cohesive unity necessarily excluded every form of the "religious difficulty," and that *imperium in imperio*, or Church and State principle, by which every kingdom of Europe has for centuries been "a kingdom divided against itself"—a kingdom in which the magistrate professed the "divine right" to hang the subject if he obeyed the priest, contrary to the laws of the State, and the priest professed another "divine right" to damn the subject if he obeyed the magistrate, contrary to the laws of the Church!

It remains to be inquired by Scripture evidence and the principles of political government, whether national Christianity, if there is or ought to be such a thing, warrants a departure from the fundamental principles of the Jewish Commonwealth, or whether the economy of *this Commonwealth was not designed to furnish the fundamental principles for the regulation of civil governments, under the Christian Dispensation?*

What those fundamental principles are has been already seen—namely,

- 1st, That the laws should derive their authority from God.
- 2nd, That the rulers should derive their authority from the laws, and not the laws derive authority from the rulers.

To these propositions the objection will at once arise, that the laws cannot derive their authority from God, unless under such circumstances as those which characterised the Jewish Commonwealth, in which God both promulgated an inspired code, and appointed the rulers that administered it. But this is to raise an objection already sufficiently disposed of,—namely, that we cannot have a theocracy except in a co-operating miraculous dispensation; the fact being, that at the present day we no more require the co-operation of miracles to constitute and govern a New Testament State, than a New Testament Church. Every such Church professes to be a theocracy, for it professes that its laws, including its doctrine and polity, derive their authority from God, and its rulers and teachers their authority from the laws. If these two principles, therefore, constitute (as we have shown) the exclusive essentials of a theocracy, and every New Testament Church professes to realise them without supernatural auxiliaries, *no reason can be assigned why they may not be similarly realised in the constitution and government of a New Testament State.* As to the part of the objection which would make it essential for a theocracy to include a divinely nominated



class of rulers, it need only be answered, that if the New Testament supplies us with a *principle* for the selection and appointment of rulers, and one as applicable to political as to ecclesiastical constitutions, then the rulers appointed by it would be just as theocratically invested and authorised as if they had been "called of God, as was Aaron" or Moses. In the absence of a direct or immediate appointment of rulers by God, there are but two principles which can possibly be resorted to for the selection or appointment of office-bearers in any New Testament Church or State. Rulers must either be *appointed by rulers*—that is, by rulers previously in office—or rulers must be *appointed by those who are ruled*. In Churches, the first of these coincides with the doctrine called by Papists and their imitators, "Apostolic Succession," and if this doctrine can be established, then Popery is right, and the New Testament wrong; for the New Testament certainly knows nothing, or teaches nothing, about "Apostolic Succession;" and, consequently, if it contains directions for the appointment of Church officials at all, these must be such as to support the principle of choosing the rulers of a Church by those who are ruled. The fact is, that the electoral principle, as we shall have occasion to show, is not merely inferentially but positively taught in the New Testament. Adapting this electoral principle in the political system, or in the choice of Parliaments and civil rulers, it is only in a theocracy that the *vox populi* can ever be truthfully called "the voice of God." For what is the voice of God but the voice of His Word; and if the general body of the people, in any State, profess to accept that Word, and make it a rule to choose only such rulers as shall profess to govern in accordance with that Word, then the people but echo the voice of God as delivered in the sacred oracles. Under such circumstances the *vox populi* would be, as literally as it is possible to have it, the very voice of God on the subject of government; and under any other circumstances (such as those now operating in the production of the unparalleled official depravity of the American Constitution), there can be no doubt that the famous *vox populi* is simply the voice of the devil.

We have very opportune proof of this conclusion in a small work just published by Elliot, Edinburgh, 1874—namely, "A Nation's Right to Worship God. By the Rev. Charles Hodge,\* D.D., of Princeton University; with a Preface and Appendix, containing an account of the important and rapidly extending American movement, for the purpose of securing the recognition of the Christian religion in the Constitution of the United States. By the Rev. E. M. Rate." The general scope of the pamphlet is

\* Dr. Hodge has since made known that he is not the author.



to trace the demoralised condition of the American official constitution to a radical defect in the legal one ; that defect being a total suppression of all national recognition of the relations and responsibilities of the Republic to a Divine Ruler. The valuable influence of this philosophical, Scriptural, and unanswerable treatise on the relations and obligations of the civil power to religion may be estimated by the fact that, since it has been published in America, some few years back, a great and growing "National Association" has come into existence, to procure a radical religious reform in the Constitution of the United States, the programme of the reformers being such as to contemplate what may be called

#### THE PROJECTED FORMATION OF AN AMERICAN THEOCRACY.

In their prosecution of this theocratic scheme, the National Association referred to are vigorously engaged in organising affiliated societies in the individual States ; and from the following petition, presented to the Constitutional Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, under the auspices of the Philadelphia Branch of the "National Association," we derive specific views of the principles and aims of the parent Association :—

*"To the Constitutional Convention of the State of Pennsylvania,  
assembled at Philadelphia :*

"Whereas the State is a beneficent institution of Heaven, ordained for the glory of God and the good of man, and placed under Jesus Christ, 'the Prince of the kings of the earth ;' and

"Whereas it is proper and right that a Christian people should make formal acknowledgment of the Divine Author of government and of the Supreme Ruler of nations in the organic law of their commonwealth ; and

"Whereas, the fathers of our country did recognize and act on these fundamental principles in laying the foundation of our government in Christian morality or religion, and by explicit acknowledgments of the State's allegiance to God ; and

"Whereas, the absence of such acknowledgments from the Constitutions of the United States, and of many of the [component] States, is made, by the enemies of the Christian religion, an argument for obliterating all Christian features from our States and national governments,—

"We, the undersigned, citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, deeply convinced that the welfare of our State and people, and the preservation of our civil and religious liberties, *are inseparable from a recognition of the sovereignty of Jehovah and His Christ*, do memorialise your honourable body to place



in the draft of the Constitution to be submitted to the people, an explicit acknowledgment of Almighty God *as the ultimate source of authority in civil government, of the Lord Jesus as the Ruler of nations, and of the Bible as the supreme standard of righteous law*; and thus indicate that this is a Christian Commonwealth, and place all the Christian laws, institutions, and usages of the State on an undeniable legal basis in our fundamental law."—P. 65.

The pamphlet embraces important matter, both historical and expository, touching this movement in the United States, tracing the causes of the original departure of the States from the theocratic principles which the Pilgrim Fathers carried with them, and set up on the American shores. It also exhibits the part the Jesuits have played in aiding "the gigantic frauds of the Tammany Ring," and in utilising "the Ring" to obtain those immense sums which they have come to acquire for the support of Popery in the States. This movement ought to be particularly commended to the notice of our Scotch Voluntary friends, who have been accustomed to point to America as affording conclusive experimental evidence in favour of their principles; and it ought to be *more* particularly pressed upon the notice of the authors of that flatulent fanfaronade of sacerdotal emptiness, which has been lately issued as a manifesto of the principles held by the largest of our Voluntary Churches.\*

#### THE THREE STATE-CHURCH SYSTEMS.

In the absence of all thoroughgoing effort to found their political constitutions on theocratic principles, and to adopt the Bible as the distinct basis of all civil legislation, the States of Europe early incorporated Christianity with their political constitutions, on the State-Church principle, with which we have been familiar for so many centuries, and of which there are but three possible forms—the *Political State-Church system*, in which the Church and State are combined, and the seat of supremacy between them is lodged in the State or its rulers—the *Sacerdotal State-Church system*, in which the Church and State are combined, and the seat of supremacy is lodged in the Church or its priesthood—and the *Separated State-Church system*, in which the State and the Church agree to exist as unconnected and mutually independent institutions.

The political State-Church system was that which was obviously aimed at by the early Reformers (Dr. Lee's *Erastus*), although

\* The pretentious missive issued in allocutionary tones by the United Presbyterian Church in 1873.



it speedily failed to give general satisfaction; for although, in adopting this system, the Reformed States made a faint approach to a theocratic character, the political and ecclesiastical elements were never sufficiently assimilated and cohesively united, and, therefore, have never allowed the Reformed realms to acquire that integrity of constitution which would have saved them from results about to be witnessed throughout the whole of European Christendom (with the probable exception of Russia, for reasons to be hereafter adverted to)—namely, the total separation of politics and religion, and of the States from the Churches heretofore in union with them. Nevertheless, the Reformed State-Church system, with all the defects arising from want of thoroughness, has proved of unspeakable benefit to humanity, and especially to the realms of England and Scotland, where it has had the fairest trial, with the result of elevating those realms in the scale of nations, and of giving them to possess a degree of civil and religious liberty, of material prosperity and political influence, unexampled in the history of European nations.

The sacerdotal State-Church system means Popery, which has invariably maintained the “divine right” of the Church to govern the State. In this system the civil magistrate is duly invested with religious relations and responsibilities, but only through and by the church; for, instead of being “a minister of God,” as the Scriptures call him (Rom. xiii. 4), the canon law of the Papacy expressly denominates and characterises him, not as a minister of God, but as a minister of the Pope. What Pius the Ninth so lately said to the civil ruler of Germany, he says to all such rulers, You are my servants: “you are mine.”

The separated State-Church system is the modernly agitated system of Liberationism, and is theologically represented by the Voluntary religionists of our times. Its principle has not been yet very definitely formulated, so as to comprehend the various views held by the many parties that unite in a common hostility to political religion. But the prominent and more authoritative expositors of the Voluntary principle, as the late well-known Dr Wardlaw of Glasgow (whose views are now being industriously advocated by the American *Independent*, in opposition to the theocratic movement referred to), make their accepted views of the relations of the civil magistrate sufficiently plain. They tell us that the proper relation of the magistrate to religion consists in possessing “no relation at all.”—*Pamphlet*, Preface, p. 9.

The Voluntary system, therefore, is a Voluntary compound of Popery and Atheism—of political Popery and political Atheism. Like Popery, it seeks to liberate religion from the power of the civil magistrate; but, unlike Popery, and like Atheism, it seeks to liberate the civil magistrate from religion, or rather to compel



him to discharge his public functions without any official relation to God or the Gospel. It is for this reason that the Voluntary agitators of this country, as well as of America, are obliged to fraternise with such opposite political colleagues as Papists and infidels. When the object of the Liberationist is (1) to liberate religion from the authority of the magistrate, he is under the obligation of a kindred principle to co-operate with the Papist, and the Papist with the Voluntary. When the object is (2) to liberate the magistrate from the authority of religion, then the Voluntary (who holds, with the infidel, that the magistrate's proper relation to religion is "no relation at all") is under the like obligation to co-operate with the infidel, and the infidel with the Voluntary. Thus, as a double spiritual seditionist—a seditionist against the ruling relations of the magistrate to Christ, and of Christ to the magistrate, the Voluntary religionist is obliged to battle for his system between the flanks of two parties, whom, by his better principles, he knows to be the paramount "enemies of all righteousness."

#### "THE FREE CHURCH IN THE FREE STATE."

The liberation of the Church from the State, and of the State from the Church, is to bring about the happy condition of the divorced couple so tersely and compactly expressed in the now famous Cavournian *mot* or motto—"A free Church in a free State." The system is at once to liberate the Church from the State, and the State from the Church. There is, however, one point in the programme of the policy which shows it to be witless, as well as wicked. The programme defines a free Church in a free State to mean—*separate spheres of jurisdiction, and the independent dominion of each in the separate spheres*. But it makes no provision for determining the spheres in which each of them is to be free. It will not do to tell us that one is to be free in the sphere of religion, and the other in the sphere of politics, for the quarrels between them have always arisen from the fact, that what one calls religion, the other calls politics, and *vice versa*; and Dr. Manning is very near truthful when he says there is no difference between politics and religion. It is sufficiently plain that each cannot be free to determine the sphere in which the other is to be free, for then the meaning of Cavour's motto would be, that each is to be free to determine the freedom of the other—a thing incompatible with the freedom of either. If the State is to be free to determine in what matters the Church is to be free, then the meaning of a free State is, that the State is to be free to govern the Church; and if the Church is to be free to decide in what matters the State is to be free, then the



meaning of a free Church is, that the Church is to be free to govern the State. Is it any wonder, then, that an "Advanced Liberal" organ (the *Pall Mall Gazette*) should sagaciously forecaste the coming result of the "free" policy, when it characterises a free Church in a free State to practically mean a perpetuated "free fight" between both!

#### VOLUNTARY FALLACIES, AND FALSIFICATION OF SCRIPTURE.

The self-contradictory fallacies and impracticable problems involved in the projected policy of a free Church in a free State, exhibit but a very small portion of the stultification associated with the defence of the Voluntary system. Who, but the shallowest defender of error, could see any force in the objection that one man should not be forced to pay for the support of another man's religion; seeing that, if there is any force in the objection, there is a double force in the objection that one man should not be forced to pay for another man's politics; for politics affect interests which every man cares about, while religion affects interests which, unhappily, very few care about. With the ordinary judge of things, to pay for a religion which we believe to be false, only violates the personal feelings to the extent of the tax paid; but to pay for the support of a policy which we believe to be false, and prejudicial to our personal and public welfare, is not only to make us feel injuriously affected by the payment of the tax which supports the policy, but by the policy which the tax is to support. Or who but an equally superficial reasoner could see any force in the argument, that to compel a man to support a government for the support of religion, is to violate the conscience of the supporter, when, with others, it is an equal violation of conscience to be compelled to support a government which does not support religion. Such Voluntary objectors should be taught by their own principle (*mutatis mutandis*), that the proper relation of the civil ruler to the individual conscience is "no relation at all." No government can possibly submit to be governed by the conscience or consciences of the party governed; and all the lugubrious complaints against governments, expressed by the cry of violated consciences, is simply the result of stolid ignorance, both with respect to the functions of government and the function of the moral sentiment. No one in the universe can violate the conscience of any individual except the owner of it. If he cannot conscientiously obey the demands or commands of a government, he has only to suffer the penalty, and the conscience is kept clear; and for keeping it clear he will be rewarded by the Lord of it in due time.

But it is in the field of the Scripture that the Voluntary or



the Liberationist thinks he possesses an unassailable position when he rings the changes against Church Establishments with such triumphant argumentative pæans as those against

#### CÆSARISM.

"Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; and unto God the things that are God's." (Matt. xxii. 21.)

"And the devil, taking Christ up into a high mountain, showed unto him all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time. And the devil said unto him, All this power will I give thee, and the glory of them: for that is delivered unto me; and to whomsoever I will I give it. If thou," &c. (Luke iv. 5, &c.)

"The things that are Cæsar's," spoken of in the first of these texts, signified the things embraced within the wide circle of the dominions over which Cæsar ruled with the most absolute personal sway. Nothing outside Cæsar's empire had power to dispute his claim to universal dominion, and hence, after the empires of Babylon, Persia, and Greece had passed away, the Roman came to be Scripturally and historically characterised as the fourth universal Empire. (Dan. ii. 4.)

In the second text, the devil claimed the same power over the possessions of Cæsar which Christ ascribed in the first text to Cæsar himself—"And the devil, taking him up into a high mountain, showed unto him all the kingdoms of the world (or of the Roman Empire) in a moment of time. And the devil said, . . . All this *power is given unto me, and to whomsoever I will I give it.*"

Here, for once in his lying career, the devil told truth; the truth being, that, at the period, the whole world, with the exception of God's few and unknown elect ones, was under the complete moral dominion of the devil. In the course of Christ's triple temptation on the occasion, the Saviour parried every assault and assertion of the tempter by Scripture weapons; but He had no passage to quote against, no argument to gainsay, or no ground on which to challenge the devil's direct, plain, and confident assertion that he was master of the world, or of the Roman Empire, and had acquired power to dispose of it "to whomsoever he willed." He held this dominion of Cæsar's empire by the same claim that Cæsar himself held it—that is, by conquest; the only difference being, that the one was the moral, the other the physical conqueror and proprietor of the world. But as moral power, or that which affects and controls mind, is superior to physical power, or that which affects and controls matter, the devil was the supreme ruler of the empire. It was by virtue of this moral supremacy that he had power to give the



empire "to whomsoever he willed." He gave it at the time to Tiberius Cæsar, and Christ recognised the validity of the gift, when He said to the Jews over whom Cæsar ruled—"Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." It is not here necessary to enter into any legal discussion as to the devil's moral *right* to the supremacy he exercised by his moral *power*. It is sufficient for us to know, that as he acquired this supremacy by what may be called the *coup d'état* of the Fall, it required the *coup d'état* of the Cross to reconquer it. Not till the self-accomplished death of Christ could He claim the moral ownership and dominion of the world over which Satan and Cæsar exercised dominion until that vanquishing act. Until *then*, His command was, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." But thenceforth Christ entered into the possession of His royal rights,\* and He was made head, not merely over the Church, but "over *all things* to the Church," or to benefit the interests of the Church. Hence, in a Christian State, where the constitution is founded upon this acquired Sovereignty of Christ, the things that once belonged to Cæsar—that is, to the devil, of whose ownership and dominion Cæsar was but the visible head, the temporal and spiritual delegate,—now *belong to God*; and to apply the passage at the head of these remarks as an argument in support of the Voluntary heresy, is to apply it to the effect that the State and the things of it, over which Christ has purchased His right to reign in behalf of the Gospel, are things that still belong to the devil instead of to Christ.

The Scriptures, therefore, nowhere give the independent Church and State principle the most remote countenance. The very distinction of Church and State is totally unknown to the New Testament page, except prophetically, as a mark of a great coming apostacy—an apostacy in which the separated Church and State principle was to be initiated and developed, with the most disastrous results to both the State and the Church. Neither in the Scriptures nor in the history of primitive Christianity can we find the smallest trace of such a national distinction as Church and State, until, as Gibbon† and other historians abundantly show, the Papal hierarchy originated this distinction in its assumed contempt of the civil power, and in the prosecution of that career of opposition and rivalry to the civil authority which that hierarchy so early inaugurated, with the desire and design of ultimately subjecting the civil to the ecclesiastical power throughout Christendom.

\* "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth."—Matt. xxviii. 18.

† See Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," chap. xx., *et passim*.





or other, is as certain as a proposition of Euclid. . . . If the mind of this guilty wretch is besieged with the horrible fancy that there is a dagger in every unfriendly hand, and a revolver waiting for him at every turning, then all we have to say is that, as usual with persecutors of the Church, Heaven has smitten him even in this world, and his punishment will begin from himself. His atrocious statement that the Catholic clergy have doomed him to a violent death, may be madness induced by crime; but if it is only an additional act of profligacy in order to extenuate his savage persecution, then will history say of this cruel coward, that he possessed not even sufficient of our common nature as could make him forgive his victims for the patience and pardon with which they endure their sufferings."

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### LETTER TO THE EDITOR ABOUT J. C.'s ARTICLE ON THE RIGHTS OF GOD AND CÆSAR.

SIR,—Your friend J. C.'s treatise upon the respective rights of God and Cæsar, is to me very unsatisfactory, and, as I think, unscriptural. At page 395, Vol. II., in reference to the Jewish official constitution, he says that "When in its full development, the political office came to be exercised in the person of a regular monarch, the supremacy of the political over the educational and ecclesiastical offices became marked and decisive."

From the treatment, however, of Saul by the prophet Samuel, of David by Nathan, of Ahab by the prophet Elijah, of Uzziah by Azariah the high priest, of Athaliah by the high priest Jehoida, and from what is stated of the power and province of the high priest in Numbers v., Deuteronomy xvii., Numbers xxvii., Hosea iv., Zechariah iv. and v., and Malachi ii., it is evident that no one of these offices was subordinated to the other, but that they possessed each a distinct and co-ordinate jurisdiction, by which the one was authorized, when necessary, to correct the other, and each to vindicate its own jurisdiction against the other. Even as types of the threefold offices of Christ as our Redeemer, it was necessary that each office should possess its own distinct and sacred sphere, undominated and unviolated by the other. m

Again, at page 400, he asserts that there are but three possible State Church systems, what we call the Erastian, the Sacerdotal or Popish, and the Separated or Voluntary system.

The distinctive and co-ordinate alliance between Church and State so plainly expounded, in accordance with the Word of God, in the Westminster Confession, and at various periods established in the best days of English and Scotch Presbyterianism, and even,

to some extent, in the Gallican or Popish Church of France—is here strangely ignored; very strangely if the writer is a Presbyterian, or at all acquainted with our Standards.

The idea that Christ authorized tribute to be paid to Cæsar on the ground that Cæsar was the Vicegerent of Satan, as “the God of this world,” and lawful ruler of the kingdoms of this world, is evidently untenable, either in the light of Scripture or of reason. No doubt Satan, since the fall, has been, to a large extent, the *de facto* ruler of this world and its kingdoms; but surely we cannot believe that the Saviour, who is now “King of Nations” by the appointment of His Father, recognised Satan as *de jure* “King of Nations,” and, as such, entitled to tribute, while that title was ascribed to Jehovah as His prerogative in His sure word of prophecy. (Jeremiah, x. vii.)

I see no difficulty in these words of Christ, as if they were intended to favour the ungodly principle of Voluntarism, by asserting an absolute separation between civil and religious duties, or between politics and religion. The question raised was *not*, Is it lawful for Cæsar, as a civil ruler, to support religion? or for Cæsar’s subjects to give him tribute for this purpose? I think our Saviour’s acquiescence in the tribute exacted by the Roman Government for the support of the Temple and its services, should settle that question.

But the question raised was, Is it lawful for Jews to give tribute of any kind to Cæsar, or to own his government at all as a lawful government? Christ’s answer is simply to the effect that there was no inconsistency between the duties of God’s people towards Himself, and their duties towards the civil government that He had set over them in His providence, and that they ought to discharge these duties at once to the one, *and* to the other.—Yours truly,

ALPHA.

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## THE GLASGOW LIBERAL M.P.'S AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS.

THEIR Annual Meeting was held in the City Hall on the 21st of January 1875. Mr. Anderson, M.P., said, “Mr. Gladstone’s expostulation I think a very mild and wise warning to the Roman Catholic laity, and I suggest to them that they ought to speak out and let us know how far they agree with the claim to the supremacy which was being made on their behalf by the leaders of their Church. Some of them have spoken out, and





